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Note 
 
You Should Be Free To Talk the Talk and Walk 
the Walk: Applying Riley v. California to Smart 
Activity Trackers 
Katharine Saphner 
Are you one of the millions of Americans tracking their 
bodily movements with a smart activity tracker produced by 
Fitbit, Jawbone, Nike, or their competitors?1 These activity 
trackers come in a variety of forms, such as wristbands,2 clip-on 
devices,3 shoe inserts,4 and shirts.5 They collect data on steps 
 
   J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2013, 
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 1. Tony Danova, Just 3.3 Million Fitness Trackers Were Sold in the US 
in the Past Year, BUS. INSIDER (May 5, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www 
.businessinsider.com/33-million-fitness-trackers-were-sold-in-the-us-in-the 
-past-year-2014-5 (indicating that 3.3 million activity trackers were sold be-
tween April 2013 and March 2014). 
 2. See, e.g., Flex, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/flex (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016); Nike + Fuelband, NIKE, https://secure-nikeplus.nike.com/plus/products/ 
fuelband (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); Up, JAWBONE, https://jawbone.com/up 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 3. See, e.g., One, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/one (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016); Zip, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/zip (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 4. See, e.g., Alice Truong, Forget Clip-on Trackers and Wristbands: This 
Smart Shoe Insole Will Track Your Physical Activity, FASTCOMPANY (Apr. 15, 
2014, 8:27 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3029051/world-changing-ideas/ 
forget-clip-on-trackers-and-wristbands-this-smart-shoe-insole-will-trac (de-
scribing a smart sole insert created by SmartMove). 
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taken,6 flights of stairs climbed,7 calories burned,8 efficiency of 
sleep,9 GPS location,10 and heart rate and respiratory activity.11 
If you are an activity tracker user, perhaps you bought your 
tracker in an effort to stay on top of your health, or maybe your 
employer gave it to you as part of a workplace health initia-
tive.12 Now suppose that you are arrested. As the arresting of-
ficer pats you down to search for weapons, he finds the Fitbit 
Charge HR13 on your wrist. May the officer lawfully toggle 
through your daily fitness statistics without a warrant? 
As time passes, this question becomes more pressing. 
American society has embraced wearable technology. Smart ac-
tivity trackers are becoming more ubiquitous each year, with 
sales increasing 500% annually over the last several years,14 
and further growth expected in the future.15 Wearers indicate 
that when these trackers are worn all day, every day, they 
cease to feel like an accessory; they become an extension of the 
 
 5. See, e.g., Robert Vamosi, Hexoskin’s On a Mission To Change Personal 
Health Management, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2014, 12:29 PM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/robertvamosi/2014/10/10/hexoskins-on-a-mission-to-change 
-personal-health-management (discussing clothing that collects health data); 
Hexoskin Wearable Body Metrics, HEXOSKIN, http://www.hexoskin.com (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016).  
 6. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2; One, supra note 3; Up, supra note 2; Zip, 
supra note 3. 
 7. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2; One, supra note 3. 
 8. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2; One, supra note 3. 
 9. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2; One, supra note 3; Up, supra note 2. 
 10. See, e.g., Forerunner® 10, GARMIN, https://buy.garmin.com/en-US/US/ 
into-sports/running/forerunner-10/prod107143.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); 
Surge, FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/surge (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 11. Charge HR, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/chargehr (last visited Mar. 
7, 2016); Fitbit Blaze, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/blaze (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016); Vamosi, supra note 5.  
 12. Employers seeking to increase productivity and decrease healthcare 
costs see activity trackers as “quick wins.” Andrea Davis, Wearable Devices: 
Future of Wellness or Just a Fad?, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS (Oct. 9, 2014,  
9:31 AM), http://ebn.benefitnews.com/news/ebn_hc_wellness_disease/wearable 
-devices-just-a-fad-or-the-future-of-wellness-2744272-1.html. 
 13. Charge HR, supra note 11. 
 14. Danova, supra note 1 (providing statistics on wearable fitness tracker 
sales). 
 15. See Worldwide Wearable Computing Market Gains Momentum with 
Shipments Reaching 19.2 Million in 2014 and Climbing to Nearly 112 Million 
in 2018, Says IDC, BUSINESS WIRE (Apr. 10, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www  
.businesswire.com/news/home/20140410005050/en/Worldwide-Wearable 
-Computing-Market-Gains-Momentum-Shipments [hereinafter Worldwide 
Wearable Computing Market] (predicting that activity trackers will lead the 
wearable tech market through 2018).  
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wearer,16 forged by a kinship very similar to that attachment 
most individuals feel to their engagement rings or to their cell 
phones. These trackers become the silent, ever-present witness 
to the lives of their wearers. The data contained on these devic-
es can therefore be indescribably helpful in police investiga-
tions in which there are no objective impartial witnesses. In 
June of 2015, the data contained in a Fitbit device helped law 
enforcement officers determine that a purported rape victim 
had not been sleeping in her bed at the time of the alleged rape 
as she had claimed, but was in fact walking around her apart-
ment.17 The Fitbit data was used not only to discredit her claim, 
but also as evidence to support the woman’s eventual prosecu-
tion. Activity trackers are increasingly prevalent, and contain a 
large quantity of intimately personal data that carries huge po-
tential to aid in law enforcement investigations. However, 
courts and scholars have yet to consider whether a suspect’s ac-
tivity tracker may be searched without a warrant incident to 
the suspect’s arrest.  
To confront this issue, courts must determine the lasting 
power of a leading Supreme Court case that has long governed 
container searches in the wake of a recent case establishing an 
exception of indeterminate breadth. In United States v. Robin-
son, the Court ruled that a container found on Robinson’s per-
son during an arrest—a crumpled package of cigarettes—could 
be searched without a warrant at the time of his arrest.18 How-
ever, the Court recently held in Riley v. California that Robin-
son does not apply to cell phones.19 Officers are therefore re-
quired to obtain a search warrant before conducting a search of 
 
 16. See, e.g., Sara M. Watson, Stepping Down: Rethinking the Fitness 
Tracker, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ 
archive/2014/09/hacking-the-fitness-tracker-to-move-less-not-more/380742 
(claiming that the author’s Fitbit was an “extension of [her] awareness of dis-
tance, of quantified movement through space”). 
 17. Mariella Moon, Fitbit Tracking Data Comes Up in Another Court Case, 
ENGADGET (June 28, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/06/28/fitbit-data 
-used-by-police (“The woman told the police she woke up around midnight with 
the stranger on top of her, and that she lost her tracker while struggling 
against her assailant. However, authorities found her Fitbit, which recorded 
her as active, awake and walking around all night.”); see also Lynnsey Gard-
ner, Fitness Tracker Data Used in Court Cases, NEWS4JAX (Feb. 22, 2016, 
11:29 PM) http://www.news4jax.com/news/investigations/fitness-tracker-data 
-now-used-as-evidence-in-court-cases (“Police believe the steps recorded on her 
device prove Nina was awake and staging the crime scene instead of being 
asleep and ripped out of bed like she claimed.”). 
 18. 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
 19. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). 
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a cell phone at the time of the suspect’s arrest.20 The Riley 
Court relied on the storage capacity and ubiquity of modern cell 
phones,21 but much of its analysis is arguably applicable to all 
digital data, whether or not it is found on a cell phone.22 Courts 
have just begun to flesh out the contours of the Riley exception, 
and must determine how to apply Riley to other digital con-
tainers, including increasingly popular smart activity trackers. 
Smart activity trackers are just one type of digital device that 
courts will have to face. In the not-so-distant future, it is prob-
able that numerous types of personal data will be collected and 
stored on devices individuals use and carry with us at all times. 
For this reason, it is crucial that courts apply Riley consistently 
to the myriad of smart devices on the market. 
This Note argues that courts should interpret Riley as pro-
scribing unwarranted searches of all digital data on smart de-
vices found on the persons of arrestees, including smart activity 
trackers. Part I describes the Court’s treatment of arrest 
searches and searches of digital data, the Court’s protection 
against certain types of unwarranted searches, and the increas-
ing popularity and capacity of smart activity trackers. Part II 
analyzes the position of smart activity trackers in relation to 
other wearable smart technology previously governed by Rob-
inson and recently contemplated by Riley, and discusses the 
need for practical and workable law enforcement rules. Part III 
concludes that courts should interpret Riley as endorsing a two-
tiered approach that carefully distinguishes warrantless 
searches of physical items from searches of the digital data 
they contain, allowing the former but prohibiting the latter. Ul-
timately, this Note argues that law enforcement officers should 
be allowed to physically search smart devices without a war-
rant, but should be required to obtain warrants to search digi-
tal data on smart activity trackers, and encourages further of-
ficer education regarding the types of devices available. 
I.  FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE HAS BEEN 
INCREASINGLY PROTECTIVE AGAINST HIGH-TECH 
GOVERNMENT INTRUSION   
Though Fourth Amendment protections have advanced in 
recent years, it is not yet clear how smart activity trackers—or 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 2489–91. 
 22. See, e.g., id. at 2485 (“No [security-based] unknowns exist with respect 
to digital data.”). 
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other smart devices—will be treated by officers conducting 
searches incident to arrest. This Part first describes the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment and introduces broad constitu-
tional search requirements, and then provides a primer on ex-
isting case law that serves as the legal backdrop for law en-
enforcement searches of smart data. Finally, this Part explores 
the growing smart activity tracker trend in greater depth, 
demonstrating the criminal justice system’s need for a defini-
tive placement of smart activity trackers within the Fourth 
Amendment framework. 
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROTECTIONS AGAINST  
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES  
The Fourth Amendment guarantees Americans the right 
“to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”23 The Founders 
wrote and adopted the Fourth Amendment specifically to pro-
tect against excessively probing searches by the government, 
policing the boundary between necessary government intrusion 
and personal privacy.24 The Founders specifically aimed to pro-
tect not only physical objects, but private information as well, 
and therefore included a specific protection of “papers.”25 The 
Court has further emphasized the focus on protecting intangi-
ble aspects of its citizens’ lives from government intrusion by 
finding that the government seizes property by meaningfully 
interfering with an individual’s possessory property interests 
and that it conducts a search when it infringes upon expecta-
tions of privacy that society considers reasonable.26 
The Supreme Court has often analyzed Fourth Amend-
ment requirements and has laid out guidelines for lower courts 
and law enforcement agencies regarding its parameters. The 
 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment also states that “no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.” Id. 
 24. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasona-
bleness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 980–84 (describing the use of suspicionless 
searches in the era just before the revolutionary war and the backlash in the 
American colonies influencing the Framers). 
 25. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
11, Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (No. 13-132) (noting that the Framers “used written 
communications, both public and private, to revolutionize political life on the 
American continent, so they promptly provided for protection of information 
against government seizure and search after the founding”).  
 26. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
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Court has generally required officers to obtain search warrants 
prior to searching, so inferences supporting the search will be 
assessed by a neutral judge and not only by the potentially bi-
ased officer.27 However, if the search falls under one of the war-
rant requirement’s many established exceptions,28 no warrant 
is necessary.29 Exceptions to the warrant requirement are es-
tablished by balancing the degree of intrusion on the defend-
ant’s privacy with the degree to which the exception is needed 
to promote government interests.30  
One exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent 
circumstances requirement, which allows law enforcement of-
ficers to perform warrantless searches in emergency circum-
stances: “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police offic-
ers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would 
gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”31 Another 
exception allows officers to conduct searches incident to lawful 
arrests—searching both the arrestee’s person32 and the area 
within the arrestee’s control.33 Though the exact scope of the le-
gally searchable area has changed over time, the Court has 
never cast doubt on the premise that at a minimum the ar-
restee’s person may be searched.34 Two discrete justifications 
support the search incident to a lawful arrest exception.35 First, 
courts have long held that officers may search for and seize 
weapons to maintain their own safety.36 Second, courts allow 
 
 27. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482. 
 28. See, e.g., Benjamin T. Clark, Why the Airport and Courthouse Excep-
tions to the Search Warrant Requirement Should Be Extended to Sporting 
Events, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 707, 715 (2006) (listing many exceptions, including 
consent, stop and frisk, airports, courthouses, hot pursuit, borders, searches 
incident to arrest, and drug testing of high school athletes). 
 29. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482. 
 30. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (discussing the 
balancing required for exceptions to the warrant requirement).  
 31. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967). 
 32. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (noting that the gov-
ernment’s right “to search the person of the accused when legally arrested . . . 
has been uniformly maintained in many cases”). 
 33. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 
 34. See id. at 225–26 (citing a string of authorities supporting the proposi-
tion). 
 35. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (detailing the 
justifications for exceptions).  
 36. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 231 (“A due regard for [the officer’s and the 
public’s] safety . . . justif[ies] a sufficient search to ascertain if such weapons 
were carried about the person . . . and . . . to seize and hold them.” (quoting 
Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482 (1867))). 
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officers to seize evidence of the crime to ensure its preserva-
tion.37 Chimel v. California laid down the first limitations on 
searches incident to arrest, holding a warrantless search of an 
entire home is unreasonable, but searching areas in the imme-
diate control of an arrestee is reasonable,38 a holding later ex-
tended to searches of the persons of arrestees.39 
B. THE COURT’S TREATMENT OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES  
PRIOR TO RILEY  
In United States v. Robinson and its progeny, the Court 
applied Chimel’s rationale to the context of police pat downs.40 
This Section describes the decisions that led to the warrant re-
quirements as they existed at the time the Court considered Ri-
ley. This Section then describes the Court’s protective treat-
ment of advanced technology in the search context.  
1. United States v. Robinson Enables Constitutional 
Container Searches  
The Robinson Court applied Chimel to the search of a con-
tainer found on an arrestee’s person.41 An officer pulled over 
Robinson on suspicion of driving without a license, informed 
him he was under arrest, and upon patting him down, “felt an 
object in the left breast pocket of the heavy coat [Robinson] was 
wearing.”42 The officer reached into the pocket and pulled out 
an object that appeared to be a “crumpled up cigarette pack-
age.”43 Feeling objects inside the package, the officer opened it, 
finding fourteen capsules filled with heroin.44  
Robinson holds that neither the search nor seizure of the 
items violated the Fourth Amendment.45 Though the opinion 
notes that the arresting officer could not tell what the object 
 
 37. See id. at 230 (“[C]ustody is of no value if the law is powerless to pre-
vent the abstraction or destruction of this evidence, without which a trial 
would be no more than an empty form.” (citing Dillon v. O’Brien [1887] 16 Cox 
Crim. Cas. 245 (Exch. Div.) (Ir.))). 
 38. 395 U.S. at 762–63.  
 39. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014). In fact, Robinson was 
the only case to apply Chimel to the search incident to lawful arrest until Ri-
ley. Id.; see Robinson, 414 U.S. at 257–59 (applying Chimel).   
 42. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220–23.  
 43. Id. at 223.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 224.  
  
1696 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1689 
 
was, and once he held the package in his hand, could not tell 
what was inside,46 the opinion notably does not address the 
search of the cigarette package as separate from the search of 
Robinson’s person.47 Instead Robinson simply states that, hav-
ing found the package during a lawful search, the officer was 
entitled to search it.48 The dissent points out that the search of 
the package did not further the protective purposes for which 
the search began, as the cigarette package was out of the hands 
of the arrestee, and therefore suggested “the mere fact of an ar-
rest should be no justification, in and of itself, for invading the 
privacy of the individual’s personal effects.”49  
In Robinson, the justification for allowing warrantless 
searches incident to arrest “rests quite as much on the need to 
disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does 
on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at 
trial.”50 Therefore, standards should not be stricter if it is un-
likely that evidence of the crime will be found on the arrestee’s 
person or there is no greater probability of weaponry being 
found on the person of the arrestee.51 Robinson favors a categor-
ical rule because law enforcement officer decisions as to how to 
search arrestees are “necessarily . . . ad hoc judgment[s]” and, 
regardless of the crime in question, arrests expose officers to 
similar levels of danger, so the Court opted to “treat[] all custo-
dial arrests alike for purposes of search justification.”52  
Justice Marshall’s dissent in Robinson spells out several 
concerning outcomes that could flow from Robinson’s holding, 
including the potential for officer searches of wallets and sealed 
envelopes found on the person of an arrestee on the basis that 
they might contain razor blades or pins.53 The Court addressed 
several of these concerns in later cases by narrowing Robin-
son’s scope. It first addressed exactly what may be searched at 
 
 46. Id. at 223.  
 47. See id. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (breaking the search into 
three discrete stages).  
 48. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014); Robinson, 414 
U.S. at 236; see also id. at 255–56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majority . . . 
fails to recognize that the search . . . included a separate search of effects 
found on [the defendant’s] person. . . . [T]here was no justification . . . which 
would authorize [the officer] opening the package and looking inside.”). 
 49. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 256–57 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 234 (majority opinion). 
 51. Id. at 234–35.  
 52. Id. at 235.  
 53. Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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the time of arrest without a search warrant, recognizing a more 
distinct line between the search of an individual’s person and 
his effects. In United States v. Chadwick, officers searched lug-
gage that was seized at the time and place of the defendant’s 
arrest, but was not searched until several hours later, when it 
was no longer in the control of the arrestee.54 Chadwick limits 
the Robinson warrant exception to “personal property . . . im-
mediately associated with the person of the arrestee.”55 Knowles 
v. Iowa further narrows Robinson’s scope, holding the doctrine 
inapplicable to law enforcement interactions involving only the 
issuance of citations.56 Knowles reasons that both Chimel justi-
fications are weaker when an officer issues a citation than 
when she arrests a suspect—in citation issuances, officer safety 
is not implicated to the same degree and there is no inculpatory 
evidence to destroy.57 However, due to unique circumstances in 
the vehicle context, Arizona v. Gant concludes that upon arrest, 
officers may only warrantlessly search the vehicle of the ar-
restee if “the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching dis-
tance” of the searched areas or if the officer reasonably thinks 
that the vehicle holds evidence relevant to the crime.58 
2. The Court’s Increased Protections Against High-Tech  
Searches 
In recent years, the Court has extended Fourth Amend-
ment protection to cover high-tech government searches. This 
Subsection addresses areas of particular concern for the Court. 
First, this Subsection addresses the Court’s protection of activi-
ties in the home from prying government eyes and its desire to 
protect GPS data. This Subsection goes on to discuss the 
Court’s unwillingness to protect items that have been shared 
with third parties.  
a. Protection of Information Concerning the Confines of the  
Home  
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court considered whether a 
search subject to Fourth Amendment protections occurred 
 
 54. 433 U.S. 1, 4 (1977). 
 55. Id. at 15.  
 56. 525 U.S. 113, 118–19 (1998). 
 57. Id. at 116, 118–19. 
 58. 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (noting that the exception was not implicated 
by Chimel but is needed due to unique circumstances present in automobile 
searches). 
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when police officers viewed the outside of a home with a ther-
mal imaging device to confirm the locations of high intensity 
lamps that facilitate indoor marijuana growth.59 Kyllo distin-
guishes the use of thermal imaging technology from ordinary 
visual surveillance, noting that officers gained “information re-
garding the interior of the home,” which ordinarily would re-
quire physical intrusion.60 Despite the crude system used in the 
case itself, Kyllo indicates a desire to safeguard against ad-
vanced systems, instead of “leav[ing] the homeowner at the 
mercy of advancing technology.”61 
Kyllo places particular emphasis on protecting the privacy 
of citizens, indicating that protection should depend not on the 
level of technology employed but on whether it enabled officer 
observation of intimate activity.62 However, Kyllo rejects the 
government’s suggestion that only “intimate” details need to be 
protected, saying that officers could not “know in advance 
whether . . . surveillance picks up ‘intimate’ details” and there-
fore could not determine on the spot whether surveillance 
would be constitutional.63 In the home, “all details are intimate 
details” to be kept “safe from prying government eyes.”64 
Kyllo demonstrates the Court’s willingness to consider law 
enforcement use of technology to reconstruct activities within 
the home as a search requiring a warrant, even where the offic-
ers did not physically enter the home.65 Though Kyllo focuses on 
intimate details, it goes further than finding a search occurred 
only where private information is actually discovered. It in-
stead concludes that where officers use a device not in public 
use to gather “details of the home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance 
is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a war-
rant.”66  
 
 59. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).  
 60. Id. at 32, 34. The Court found it to be a search where the technology is 
not in general public use. Id. at 40. 
 61. Id. at 35, 36 (“While the technology [here] was relatively crude, the 
rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are al-
ready in use or in development.” (footnote omitted)). 
 62. Id. at 38 (noting that even low-tech systems could determine “at what 
hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna” while a more sen-
sitive system would be able to pick up the less intimate details such as wheth-
er or not a closet light was left on). 
 63. Id. at 39.  
 64. Id. at 37. 
 65. See id. at 41–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 66. Id. at 39–40 (majority opinion). The Court found discerning activity 
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b. Court Consideration of Searches Yielding Locational Data 
In United States v. Jones, the Court again demonstrated its 
concern for citizen privacy when determining that the warrant-
less placement of a GPS device on a person’s vehicle was a 
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment as “[t]he Gov-
ernment physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information.”67 The Court had twice before held that 
gathering data from location tracking devices did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment,68 but Jones holds that placing a GPS 
tracker on a vehicle is a search because it is a physical tres-
pass.69  
Some courts also note the unique quantity and quality of 
GPS data. First, this type of data produces vast stores of infor-
mation but requires the use of very few resources by officers,70 
who can therefore gain a great deal of personal information 
about a suspect with very little effort or expense. Additionally, 
courts note that this data can be very personal: 
Disclosed in the data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature 
of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, 
the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, 
the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, 
the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and 
on and on. What the technology yields and records with breathtaking 
quality and quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply of where 
we go, but by easy inference, of our associations—political, religious, 
amicable and amorous, to name only a few—and of the pattern of our 
professional and avocational pursuits.71  
Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence indicated that the 
government keeps this data forever and can “ascertain, more or 
less at will . . . political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and 
 
within the home requires a warrant, even with no physical intrusion into the 
home. See id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 67. 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 68. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–19 (1984) (holding a pro-
cedure similar to United States v. Knotts did not constitute a violation because 
the owner consented to the transmitter’s insertion); United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1983) (holding the placement of a radio transmitter in a 
package the defendant later received was not a Fourth Amendment violation). 
 69. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 70. See id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring) (indicating it “would have re-
quired a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assis-
tance”). 
 71. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–200 (N.Y. 2009); see Jones, 
132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 
1199).  
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so on,” and suggested this may have an undesirable chilling ef-
fect on personal freedoms.72  
c. Items Shared with Third Parties Typically Receive No  
Fourth Amendment Protection  
Though it has not directly addressed the issue in the con-
text of advanced technology, the Court held in California v. 
Greenwood that citizens have no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in items shared with third parties.73 The Court found that 
a search of trash did not violate the Fourth Amendment be-
cause “respondents exposed their garbage to the public suffi-
ciently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.”74 Greenwood holds that even when not given to a third 
party, “[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left 
on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to ani-
mals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
public.”75 Jones therefore determined that “what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”76 In her 
Jones concurrence, however, Justice Sotomayor suggests that 
the third party information standard should be readdressed in 
light of the digital age.77 
C. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA  
The Court further expanded its protection of high-tech data 
in Riley, which lower courts are just beginning to apply. In Ri-
ley v. California and its companion case, United States v. 
Wurie, the Court considered whether law enforcement officers 
may search a cell phone found on an arrestee’s person without 
a warrant.78 During a pat down following Riley’s arrest for fire-
arm possession, the officer found items indicating gang affilia-
tion and a cell phone that had many features “based on ad-
vanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and 
Internet connectivity.”79 The officer proceeded to access infor-
mation on the phone, finding further indicia of gang involve-
 
 72. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 73. 486 U.S. 35, 39–42 (1988). 
 74. Id. at 40.  
 75. Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 77. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 78. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
 79. Id.  
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ment.80 A gang crimes detective found videos of men fighting 
and yelling a gang name, and photos of Riley with a car police 
believed to be involved in a recent shooting.81 Riley was charged 
with offenses related to the past shooting with an aggravating 
factor of benefiting a street gang, and was convicted on all 
counts.82  
Riley holds that “Robinson’s categorical rule . . . [is] appro-
priate . . . in the context of physical objects,” but further holds 
that Robinson’s justifications do not apply to digital data found 
on cell phones.83 Riley detects little risk of potential harm to ar-
resting officers, but nonetheless holds that an officer’s inspec-
tion of the physical contours of the device is permissible.84 Such 
a search would enable an officer to determine that the object is 
a cell phone rather than a bomb, and that there are no razor 
blades between the case and the phone, without violating the 
Constitution. The other justification—the avoidance of destruc-
tion of evidence—does not apply, as once the phone has been 
seized, the arrestee cannot destroy the phone or data within 
it.85 According to the Court, the potential to avoid passcode en-
cryption does not justify warrantless police searches of cell 
phones across the board. Police officers very seldom come 
across unlocked cell phones, and even when they do, they gen-
erally cannot conduct full searches before a data wipe occurs or 
the phone locks itself.86 The Court states that to avoid as much 
loss of evidence as possible, officers may constitutionally disa-
ble the phone’s automatic-lock feature to prevent loss of data 
access.87 Finally, the Court states that privacy interests at 
 
 80. Id. (indicating that the arresting officer noticed some of the contacts 
on the phone were preceded by letters indicating gang affiliation, correspond-
ing to other items found on Riley’s person).  
 81. Id. at 2480–81.  
 82. Id. at 2481 (indicating that gang association can carry an enhanced 
sentence).  
 83. Id. at 2484. 
 84. Id. at 2485. The government argued that searching cell phone data 
protects officers by alerting them of confederates in the area, but the Court 
found this concern was not valid and that this would broaden Chimel’s original 
justification which applied to the ability of the arrestee to use the object as a 
weapon to resist arrest or escape. Id. at 2485–86.  
 85. Id. at 2486. The Court dismissed concerns of remote data wiping, indi-
cating officers could turn off phones or place them in Faraday bags, isolating 
them from radio waves. Id. at 2487. 
 86. Id. at 2487. 
 87. Id. at 2487–88 (comparing this to securing a crime scene while await-
ing a warrant).  
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stake in a cell phone search differ from those in a physical 
search, implicating Chimel’s holding that searching arrestee’s 
home was an impermissible intrusion on the arrestee’s priva-
cy.88 Riley determines that arrestees’ decreased privacy interest 
is increased in the context of cell phones compared to searches 
of physical items.89 Riley therefore limits Robinson’s application 
and adds a layer to the Robinson analysis by stating that dif-
ferent considerations must be taken into account as to whether 
a cell phone found on the arrestee’s person may be searched. 
Robinson’s cigarette packet was not likely to contain any 
evidence that he was driving without a license, nor was it likely 
to contain anything with which Robinson might have injured 
the arresting officer, but Robinson holds the search constitu-
tional.90 Conversely, Riley determines that a search of a cell 
phone which similarly would not have injured the officers nor 
contain any evidence of the crime for which Riley was arrested 
was not constitutional. To justify its ruling, the Riley Court 
waxes poetic about the uniqueness of modern cell phones by de-
scribing their features and capabilities, comparing them to 
physical items, and touting their immense storage capacity. 
The Court describes cell phones as hybrids that contain camer-
as, calendars, diaries, maps, and newspapers, stating:  
Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received 
for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every 
book or article they have read—nor would they have any reason to at-
tempt to do so. . . .  
  . . . Cell phones couple that capacity with the ability to store many 
different types of information: Even the most basic phones that sell 
for less than $20 might hold photographs, picture messages, text 
messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, a thousand-entry 
phone book, and so on.91 
The Court also notes four unique features of cell phones 
that make their unwarranted search more likely to constitute a 
great intrusion on the privacy of the arrested individual. First, 
cell phones contain many types of information that reveal more 
 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 2484–85.  
 90. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 256 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). But see Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (indicating that the Court has not 
overlooked this point, but rather than requiring a case-by-case adjudication, 
asks instead if the application to “this particular category of effects would ‘un-
tether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception’” (quot-
ing Arizona v. Gant, 566 U.S. 332, 343 (2009))). 
 91. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
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in the aggregate than they do individually.92 Second, the vast 
capacity of cell phones allows the possessor to store a wealth of 
data of any individual type.93 Third, the span of time the data 
encompasses is far greater than the data an individual would 
naturally carry on his person.94 Fourth, the Court notes that 
most people carry cell phones, and therefore a rule allowing 
warrantless cell phone searches might have a broader reach 
than Robinson intended.95  
Riley notes the uniqueness of the type of data cell phones 
contain, suggesting the Robinson Court could never have imag-
ined the type of personal data that can now be recovered from 
cell phones, indicating that “certain types of data are also qual-
itatively different.”96 Riley explains that web browsing history 
found on cell phones “could reveal an individual’s private inter-
ests or concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms of dis-
ease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.”97 The Court also 
describes concerns regarding location information, suggesting 
that access to this data would allow police to “reconstruct 
someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only 
around town but also within a particular building.”98 The Court 
goes on to explain that “[t]he average smart phone user has in-
stalled 33 app[lication]s, which together can form a revealing 
montage of the user’s life.”99 The Court apparently does not find 
browsing history or such intensive personal data to be disposi-
tive, however. Companion plaintiff Wurie’s cell phone was a 
 
 92. Id. (noting the possibilities of addresses, notes, prescriptions, bank 
statements, and videos). 
 93. Id. (explaining the practical difference between a single photo “tucked 
into a wallet” and “a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and 
descriptions”). 
 94. Id. (comparing a slip of paper in a man’s pocket reminding him to call 
a friend to a record of all communications with that friend over the past sever-
al months). 
 95. Id. at 2490 (“Allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a rou-
tine basis is quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or 
two in the occasional case.”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (“There are apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party 
news; apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps for sharing prayer 
requests; apps for tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for planning your 
budget; apps for every conceivable hobby or pastime; apps for improving your 
romantic life. There are popular apps for buying or selling just about anything, 
and the records of such transactions may be accessible on the phone indefinite-
ly.”). 
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non-smart phone, a phone type which the Court notes “general-
ly has a smaller range of features than a smart phone” that 
may not include internet access or a wide array of apps.100 Nev-
ertheless, the Court holds that the search of such a phone re-
quires a warrant. 
The Court also touches on special issues presented by cloud 
computing, stating that searches of data in the cloud are un-
constitutional, but officers—and the owner of the phone—may 
not know whether a file is stored on the cloud or on the phone, 
causing further difficulties in searching cell phones.101 
Riley holds that officers must secure warrants before 
searching cell phones.102 It explicitly rejects less practical op-
tions, refusing to extend Gant to cell phones by restricting ac-
cess to areas of the phone whose non-digital counterparts were 
searchable.103 Riley notes how quickly warrants can be ob-
tained104 and points out that the exigent circumstances excep-
tion can be used in instances when the particular situation is so 
dire as to make a warrantless search reasonable.105  
D. LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF RILEY  
In the months following Riley, lower courts have disagreed 
on the appropriate standard for searches of digital data and 
how Riley should be applied to other smart devices. Interpreta-
tions of Riley’s application to cell phone searches seem to follow 
directly from the ruling. For example, one court held that look-
ing at the serial number of the phone is likely a “physical at-
tribute” of the phone itself, not a piece of data, and therefore 
not considered a search of digital data entitled to Riley protec-
tions.106 Another court found that looking at the screen saver of 
a phone is acceptable under the plain view doctrine.107  
 
 100. See id. at 2481. 
 101. “Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices to dis-
play data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself.” Id. at 
2491. 
 102. Id. at 2485. 
 103. Id. at 2493. 
 104. Id. (citing to the example of a jurisdiction where police officers use 
iPads to e-mail warrant requests to judges and receive valid warrants in under 
fifteen minutes). 
 105. Id. at 2494 (listing evidence destruction and pursuit of fleeing sus-
pects as exigencies). 
 106. United States v. Lowe, No. 2:14-cr-00004-JAD-VCF, 2014 WL 5106053 
(D. Nev. Oct. 1, 2014). 
 107. Sinclair v. State, 118 A.3d 872, 888 (Md. 2015). 
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However, when applying Riley to other smart devices, 
courts have varied in their interpretations. Some courts hold 
that Riley protects all digital data, on the basis that “Riley held 
unequivocally that digital data is not subject to the warrant ex-
ception for searches incident to arrest and . . . officers must ob-
tain a warrant before searching the contents of an arrestee’s 
electronic devices,”108 and indicate that under Riley, citizens 
now have a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of 
their electronic devices.”109 
Other courts, however, have eagerly limited Riley’s appli-
cation outside the specific context of cell phones. Courts have 
found that Riley does not prevent searches of credit cards or 
searches of digital cameras, but even courts agreeing on the re-
sult do not agree on the method to determine whether such a 
search is legal. At least two courts have found that searches of 
the magnetic stripes on the back of credit and gift cards are not 
protected under Riley.110 The standards applied by each court to 
determine the permissibility of these searches were different. 
One court explained that the “quality and quantity of personal 
information” on a magnetic stripe was not comparable to that of 
a smartphone.111 The other court stated that the amount of data 
included in the stripe “would not allow officers to reconstruct 
an individual’s private life.”112  
Other courts have addressed the question of Riley’s appli-
cation to digital cameras. Some courts have found that the digi-
tal data found on cameras is not protected from a warrantless 
search incident to arrest.113 Once again, there appears to be an 
inconsistency across the courts when it comes to the standard 
for determining that Riley does not protect data on digital cam-
eras. One court found that the camera in question was not pro-
tected because it did not have the capabilities of a smartphone, 
nor were the photos labeled in such a manner that an individu-
al’s life could be reconstructed.114 Another court stated that dig-
 
 108. United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 817 (D. Md. 2015). 
 109. State v. Purtell, 851 N.W.2d 417, 427 (Wis. 2014). 
 110. See United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 621 (6th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Benjamin, No. 4:14-CR-3089, 2014 WL 5431349, at *4 (D. Neb. Oct. 
24, 2014). 
 111. See Benjamin, 2014 WL 5431349, at *3.  
 112. See Bah, 794 F.3d at 633. 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 34 F. Supp. 3d 695, 701 (E.D. Mich. 
2014); People v. Raoult, 2d Crim. No. B256148, 2015 WL 3874302, at *1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. June 23, 2015). 
 114. See Raoult, 2015 WL 3874302, at *3. 
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ital cameras are not used on a continuous basis like cell phones 
are, and that “cameras contain a limited type of data, restricted 
to image and video files, that do not touch the breadth or depth 
of information that a cell phone’s data offers.”115  
Scholarly commentary indicates that it is not entirely clear 
how Riley should be applied to other devices. The Court’s deci-
sion to consider Riley and Wurie together despite the very dif-
ferent phones underlying the two cases may imply that it would 
be “reasonable for a court to assume that the ability to make 
and receive phone calls is dispositive, given the Court’s group-
ing together of the general category of cell phones.”116 The 
Court’s joint consideration of Wurie and Riley might also indi-
cate that any device that implicates more privacy concerns 
than a non-smart cell phone should not be searched without a 
warrant.117 Alternatively, Riley might encourage a “contextual 
approach” in which a court “looks to social norms to determine 
whether a particular disclosure is ‘expected’ under the circum-
stances.”118 
Court readings of Riley are clearly inconsistent and will on-
ly breed confusion as courts are forced to apply Riley to new 
and varying smart devices. Courts need a singular standard by 
which to assess the warrant requirements for all smart devices, 
lest citizens’ privacy be better protected when their pictures are 
on their phones than on their cameras. 
E. THE INCREASING UBIQUITY AND CAPACITY OF SMART  
ACTIVITY TRACKERS 
Technology has advanced since Robinson’s container 
search rule, and continues to evolve rapidly.119 As Riley noted, 
some technological devices are a “pervasive and insistent part 
of daily life.”120 This is quickly becoming true of smart activity 
 
 115. Miller, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 700.  
 116. Kelly Ozurovich, Comment, Riley v. California—Cell Phones and 
Technology in the Twenty-First Century, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 507, 521 (2014). 
 117. Id.  
 118. Natasha H. Duarte, The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth 
Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93 N.C. L. 
REV. 1140, 1143 (2015). 
 119. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (noting that ten 
years previously, smart phones would have been “unheard of,” and that even 
flip phones like Wurie’s have existed for less than fifteen years). 
 120. Id. (suggesting cellphones in particular are so commonplace that “the 
proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of 
human anatomy”).  
  
2016] SMART ACTIVITY TRACKERS 1707 
 
trackers, which are worn on the body and allow wearers to tog-
gle through their statistics at the touch of a button.121 Of all 
these companies, Fitbit has been particularly successful. It had 
sold 20.8 million units as of March 2015, and its users include 
not only your friends and family, but also President Obama and 
Britney Spears.122 Additionally, in an analysis of popular mobile 
applications (apps), Fitbit’s app, through which the user can 
track weight, water, and food intake to supplement the data 
gathered by the associated device,123 is the second most popular 
app associated with a connected device124 on the Apple and 
Google Play stores.125  
The data these devices contain varies by device and, un-
surprisingly, the capacity of these devices has become more ad-
vanced as time progresses. For illustrative purposes, one can 
look to the historical development of the devices produced by 
Fitbit, the most popular smart activity tracker creator.126 The 
original Fitbit, often dubbed “Fitbit classic,” was first produced 
 
 121. See Nathan Chandler, How Fitbit Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http:// 
electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/other-gadgets/fitbit.htm (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016) (describing Fitbit’s OLED screen, which scrolls through the us-
er’s current fitness statistics); Rachael Rettner, Tracker Craze: Fitness Wrist-
bands’ Popularity Will Continue To Grow, FOX NEWS (Jan. 2, 2014), 
http://www.foxnews.com/health/2014/01/02/tracker-craze-fitness-wristbands 
-popularity-will-continue-to-grow (“Fitness trackers . . . are rapidly increasing 
in popularity, and experts say this trend will continue in the coming years.”). 
 122. See Ananya Bhattacharya, Fitbit Is Now Worth $4.1 Billion After IPO, 
CNNMONEY (June 25, 2015, 9:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/17/  
investing/fitbit-ipo. 
 123. Though activity tracker devices are frequently linked to apps with 
which nutritional and weight information are logged, such information is 
saved on the website itself, not within the wearable device, and is therefore 
not among the data with which this Note is concerned. 
 124. Popularity of the Fitbit app is a rough proxy for popularity of the 
Fitbit devices. Apps connected to outside devices are apps designed (some-
times solely) to gather information from a separate device from the phone it-
self. The Fitbit app displays the user’s daily step tally, calorie burn, active 
minutes, and sleep quality. This information can only be displayed if the user 
actually uses a Fitbit device and connects it to the account.  
 125. See Aditi Pai, Only Google Chromecast’s App Is More Popular than 
Fitbit’s in Connected Device Category, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Oct. 9, 2014),  
http://mobihealthnews.com/37214/only-google-chromecasts-app-is-more 
-popular-than-fitbits-in-connected-device-category (noting that other apps 
connect to television streaming services, printers, or credit card readers). 
 126. See Robert Hof, How Fitbit Survived as a Hardware Startup, FORBES 
(Feb. 4, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2014/02/04/how 
-fitbit-survived-as-a-hardware-startup (noting that “Fitbit has 77% of the 
market for full-body activity trackers”). 
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in 2009127 and tracked steps, distance, activity intensity, and 
sleep.128 Fitbit next produced the Fitbit Ultra in 2011, adding 
an accelerometer that tracked the wearer’s elevation, then sub-
sequent models, including the One, Zip, and Flex, which sync 
wirelessly to cell phones using Bluetooth technology and con-
tain some permutation of the aforementioned features.129 Newer 
devices contain heart rate and GPS data.130 Both existing and 
potential users have concerns about the privacy implications of 
tracking this information,131 and even some elected officials 
have noted the importance of keeping this “highly personal in-
formation” safe.132  
On the other hand, this data has the potential to be very 
useful to law enforcement and the judiciary due to its objective 
and mechanical nature. At least two lawsuits are pending at 
the time of this writing that rely heavily on Fitbit data. First, 
in a personal injury suit, data will be used to establish that the 
plaintiff’s quality of life has decreased since an accident due to 
reduced physical activity.133 Second, in a criminal prosecution, 
law enforcement relied on the Fitbit data of a purported rape 
victim to prosecute her for a false rape report.134 While the 
 
 127. Id. (noting that Fitbit classics went up for order in December 2009). 
 128. See Robert J. Nelson, Everything You Need To Know About Fitbit, 
IMORE (June 12, 2014, 8:24 AM), http://www.imore.com/everything-you-need 
-know-about-fitbit. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Charge HR, supra note 11; Forerunner® 10, supra note 10 (explaining 
that data can be uploaded “[w]ith a simple connection to your computer”). 
 131. See Laura Schooler, Wearable Technology Future Is Ripe for Growth—
Most Notably Among Millennials, Says PwC US, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 
LLP (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2014/wearable 
-technology-future.html (describing a survey in which “82 percent of respond-
ents were worried that wearable technology would invade their privacy and 86 
percent expressed concern that wearables would make them more vulnerable 
to security breaches”). 
 132. See Press Release, Charles E. Schumer, Senator, N.Y., Fitbit Bracelets 
and Smartphone Apps Are Tracking Users’ Movements and Health Data that 
Could Be Sold to Third Parties (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.schumer.senate 
.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumer-reveals-without-their-knowledge-fitbit 
-bracelets-and-smartphone-apps-are-tracking-users-movements-and-health 
-data-that-could-be-sold-to-third-parties-calls-for-ftc-to-require-mandatory 
-opt-out-opportunity-before-any-personal-data-can-be-sold.  
 133. See Moon, supra note 17; Nina Zipkin, Move Over DNA, Your Weara-
ble Data Could Soon Be Used in the Courtroom, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 17, 
2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/239869 (hailing this Canadian 
case as “the first case of its kind” which could set precedent for future claims). 
 134. See Myles Snyder, Police: Woman’s Fitness Watch Disproved Rape Re-
port, ABC27NEWS (June 19, 2015), http://abc27.com/2015/06/19/police 
-womans-fitness-watch-disproved-rape-report. 
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woman had claimed she was sleeping when “an unknown man 
pulled her out of bed, attacked her in a bathroom, and raped 
her at knifepoint,”135 her Fitbit Surge indicated she had been 
awake and walking around throughout the night.136 Ultimately, 
this woman was charged with “false reports to law enforce-
ment, false alarms to public safety, and tampering with evi-
dence” for creating a scene of a struggle.137 Parties to litigation 
are already realizing the potential of this data to aid in check-
ing credibility and even to support prosecutions. 
It is crucial at this juncture to recognize that smart activity 
trackers are not the only devices that have the potential to cap-
ture more personal data than ever before. Activity trackers are 
just one manifestation of the recent expansion of the “Internet 
of Things.” This theory describes a not-so-distant future in 
which “nearly everything that can be connected to the Internet 
will be.”138 In the “Internet of Things,” “[e]verything from televi-
sions to refrigerators to electricity meters will be capable of re-
cording data.”139 Other unique notable examples of the “Inter-
net of Things” include Google Glass,140 the Apple Watch,141 and 
Filip, which is marketed to parents for use by their young chil-
dren and hosts a limited array of features that nonetheless con-
tain intimate personal information.142 Developers will inevita-
bly continue to develop advanced technologies for devices that 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Stephanie M. Lee, As Companies Collect More Health Data, Cops 
Will Ask To See It, BUZZFEED (Nov. 5, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.buzzfeed 
.com/stephaniemlee/law-enforcement-requests-for-users-health-and-biometric 
-data (indicating that the Fitbit model was a Surge). 
 137. Snyder, supra note 134.  
 138. Brad Turner, When Big Data Meets Big Brother: Why Courts Should 
Apply United States v. Jones To Protect People’s Data, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
377, 392 (2015). 
 139. Id.  
 140. See Anisha Mehta, Comment, “Bring Your Own Glass:” The Privacy 
Implications of Google Glass in the Workplace, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. 
& PRIVACY L. 607, 609 (2014) (describing Google Glass’s “ability to continuous-
ly record and transmit data within the wearer’s surroundings”). 
 141. See Apple Unveils Apple Watch—Apple’s Most Personal Device Ever, 
APPLE (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2014/09/09Apple 
-Unveils-Apple-Watch-Apples-Most-Personal-Device-Ever.html (describing 
Apple’s “most personal device ever,” which allows the wearer to transmit their 
“heartbeat” to another user). 
 142. See Stay Connected on Any Adventure: Next Generation Wearable 
Phone & Locator for Kids, FILIP, http://www.myfilip.com/about-filip (last visit-
ed Mar. 7, 2016) (describing a device that looks like a watch, but contains a 
GPS tracker and allows the wearer to call five numbers and receive—but not 
send—text messages). 
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can be worn on one’s person that will contain an increasing 
quantity of data of an increasingly personal nature. With Rob-
inson still guiding the search of physical items, and Riley pur-
porting to apply only to cell phones, courts must develop a 
standard as to how devices between these two extremes should 
be handled. 
II.  EXISTING FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
INDICATES THAT DIGITAL DATA ON ACTIVITY 
TRACKERS SHOULD BE PROTECTED   
The standards lower courts have used when applying Riley 
to magnetic stripes of credit cards and digital cameras indicate 
a need for a clear and consistent interpretation of Riley’s ap-
plicability to smart devices that are not cell phones. Riley cast 
additional Fourth Amendment protection over cell phones, 
holding that an unwarranted search of a cell phone was an un-
reasonable search. To determine whether an unwarranted 
search of a smart activity tracker should likewise be considered 
unreasonable, this Part compares cell phones and activity 
trackers. It determines that activity trackers contain less data 
than cell phones, but that the digital data activity trackers hold 
is extremely personal, and therefore this data merits special 
treatment from the Robinson rule. This Part goes on to discuss 
the law enforcement need for easily workable and practical 
rules, the Court’s deference to this need, and when the Court 
has been willing to make exceptions to bright-line rules in the 
past.  
A. CELL PHONES AND ACTIVITY TRACKERS ARE SIMILAR BUT  
NOT IDENTICAL 
Because Riley’s outcome is justified by the “pervasiveness 
of cell phones and their capacity to retain and transport the 
privacies of life,”143 it is important to compare the two types of 
devices. This Section compares cell phones and activity track-
ers, looking at the way that these devices are carried, their 
physical capacity to hide weapons, and their societal preva-
lence. The Section then compares the type and quantity of data 
that is held by each type of device, as well as methods through 
which the data is stored.  
 
 143. Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky & Privacy Concerns on the Ground, 
11 SCITECH LAW., no. 4, 2015, at 6, 9. 
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1. Comparing the Place of Cell Phones and Activity Trackers  
in Society and on Our Bodies  
Before exploring the data held by each type of device, it is 
important to compare the physical nature of the devices them-
selves, as well as their respective places in society. Activity 
trackers, like cell phones, are frequently carried continuously 
on one’s person, and are therefore likely to be found during a 
pat down.144 Activity trackers are perhaps more likely to be 
found on the person, as they are designed to be worn on the 
body as an armband or tucked inside of clothing.145 Activity 
trackers do not record any personal data if they are not worn on 
the person.146 Cell phones, on the other hand, while frequently 
carried in the pocket, are not always kept there, and may be 
found just as often in a purse or placed on an adjacent sur-
face.147 This means that activity trackers are even more likely 
than cell phones to be found and inspected during searches in-
cident to arrest or during frisks performed under reasonable 
suspicion.  
Activity trackers are fairly similar physically to cell phones 
both in size and in their lack of capacity to harm officers. Both 
cell phones and activity trackers tend to fit within the palm of 
one’s hand, though activity trackers are smaller than cell 
phones.148 Because the devices are fairly similar physically, 
they likely hold the same low potential for danger to officers. 
Despite the relative unlikelihood that a cell phone could conceal 
a weapon with potential to injure an officer, under Riley officers 
may search cell phones physically to seek out weapons.149 The 
 
 144. See Worldwide Wearable Computing Market, supra note 15 (referring 
to fitness trackers as “wearables”).  
 145. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2 (“Flex fits comfortably around your wrist 
. . . so you can wear it day to night.”); One, supra note 3 (“One clips securely 
and discretely onto your pocket, belt or bra . . . .”). 
 146. See Nicole Radziszewski, Expert Answers: Is It Safe To Wear My Wire-
less Fitness Tracker All the Time?, EXPERIENCE LIFE (Nov. 2014), https:// 
experiencelife.com/article/expert-answers-is-it-safe-to-wear-my-wireless 
-fitness-tracker-all-the-time (“[U]nlike cell phones, activity trackers are meant 
to be worn on the body around the clock.”). 
 147. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (“According to one 
poll, nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet 
of their phones most of the time . . . .”). 
 148. Compare One, supra note 3 (describing the Fitbit One as being 1.89 
inches long, 0.76 inches wide, and 0.38 inches thick), with See all iPhone Mod-
els, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/compare (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) 
(listing dimensions of four recent incarnations of the iPhone, which tend to be 
around five to six inches long and two to three inches wide).  
 149. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (“Law enforcement officers remain free to ex-
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need to take into account officer safety in light of the potential 
for concealed weapons should be considered when structuring 
police rules for handling activity trackers.150  
Finally, as noted extensively in Riley, cell phones are ubiq-
uitous in our society.151 The Court was quite concerned with the 
implications of allowing warrantless searches of devices that 
were so widely carried.152 At this point, activity trackers are be-
coming more common but have not reached the societal satura-
tion cell phones have achieved.153 This might indicate that ac-
tivity trackers do not need the same protections as cell phones, 
at least at this time. However, the Court tends to think forward 
in the context of technology,154 and with the current level of 
growth in the activity tracker market,155 providing greater pro-
tections than current numbers might require would be prudent 
and forward thinking.  
2. Activity Trackers Hold Less Data, but More Private  
Information, than Cell Phones 
The crux of whether or not Riley should be applied to re-
quire warrants to search smart activity trackers is whether the 
data they contain is similarly private to that of cell phones and 
thus merits Fourth Amendment protection. This Subsection 
begins by explaining that while one of the most central features 
of cell phones is their inherent ability to communicate with ex-
 
amine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a 
weapon—say, to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden between the 
phone and its case.”). 
 150. The Court has in the past indicated a willingness to make exceptions 
to the search incident to arrest exception where there is little to no likelihood 
of weaponry or evidence of the crime to be found on the arrestee’s person. See 
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 (1998). However, the Court’s willingness to 
allow searches of cell phones for officer safety likely eliminates the possibility 
of a Knowles-style exception here.  
 151. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (indicating that “more than 90% of American 
adults . . . own a cell phone”). 
 152. Id. (stating that though police might have “occasionally” stumbled up-
on a diary in the past, cell phones would crop up far more frequently). 
 153. See Dorene Internicola, Activity Trackers Get Smarter at Measuring 
Fitness, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/22/ 
us-fitness-trackers-idUSKBN0K00JJ20141222 (indicating that in the fall of 
2013, one in ten American adults wore an activity tracker). 
 154. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“[T]he technology 
used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take ac-
count of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in develop-
ment.”). 
 155. See Rettner, supra note 121.  
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ternal devices and individuals, activity trackers generally do 
not have this ability. On the other hand, the purpose of activity 
trackers, unlike that of cell phones, is to gather personal data 
about their user and store it within the device. Finally, this 
Subsection compares the storage capacity and methods of cell 
phones and activity trackers and concludes that activity track-
ers hold far less data then cell phones, albeit data of an inher-
ently private nature. 
a. Cell Phones Are Designed for External Communication 
In describing the capacity of the modern cell phone, Riley 
focuses most on their capacity to communicate with other de-
vices and individuals.156 Most modern cell phones have the ca-
pacity to connect to the Internet.157 This ability to connect to the 
Internet enables and encourages cell phone users to engage in 
many private and intimate activities, such as banking, Internet 
browsing, and the downloading and use of apps that yield addi-
tional information about the user.158 The Court’s interest in pro-
tecting this information from law enforcement seems counter-
intuitive when considering the fact that in purchasing apps, 
calling or texting other cell phone users, or engaging in any 
other Internet-based activity, the cell phone user has necessari-
ly engaged in the sharing of data with third parties, which tra-
ditionally has left the user with no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.159 This may influence the Court’s willingness to recon-
sider the third-party standard in light of the digital age.160 
However, Riley made no explicit statement that users have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in any of these types of data. 
In both Wurie and Riley, the information gained from the phone 
had not been shared with anyone—Riley’s gang involvement 
was inferred from photos on his phone, while Wurie’s phone 
yielded a call to a number he labeled as “my house.”161 Some 
 
 156. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at passim (describing call logs, text messaging, e-
mail, voicemail, app downloads, and internet browsing history). 
 157. See id. (describing smartphone capacity to store internet browsing his-
tory and connect to the cloud). 
 158. See id. at 2490. 
 159. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that be-
cause the trash was left on the curb and intended to be handed over to a third 
party, the owners had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it).  
 160. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“[The third party disclosure] approach is ill suited to the digital 
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”). 
 161. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
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scholars argue that the third-party exception should be cur-
tailed or limited, as in the modern world “a once small and 
manageable exception to the Fourth Amendment . . . now 
threatens to swallow whole the privacy guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment.”162 
Activity trackers, on the other hand, have a more limited 
ability to connect and share data. These devices can typically 
only connect to cell phones and computers,163 which then upload 
the data to the tracker’s associated website or app.164 Activity 
trackers are typically not capable of sharing data beyond this 
limited capacity and cannot communicate from device to de-
vice.165 While there would potentially be a glimmer of an officer 
safety concern in the context of use of a cell phone to communi-
cate with confederates,166 no such concern exists with activity 
trackers.  
b. Activity Trackers Gather Different and More Personal Data  
than Cell Phones 
While cell phones are designed to communicate with the 
outside world, activity trackers are designed to collect data 
about the way users live their lives, and then display it back to 
the user.167 The type of data collected is intimate and private in 
 
 162. Turner, supra note 138, at 381; see also Jane Bambauer, Other Peo-
ple’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 262 (2015) (advocating for a restructuring of 
the third party doctrine).  
 163. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2 (advertising Flex’s ability to “sync[] auto-
matically and wirelessly to tablets, computers and . . . smartphones”). 
 164. This connection can be wireless. See, e.g., id. (indicating the Flex can 
“[s]ync stats wirelessly [and] automatically to leading smartphones and com-
puters”); Up3, JAWBONE, https://jawbone.com/fitness-tracker/up3 (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016) (stating that Up3 “syncs wirelessly using Bluetooth®”). Alterna-
tively, this connection can come through a physical connection. See Forerun-
ner® 10, supra note 10 (explaining that data can be uploaded “[w]ith a simple 
connection to your computer”). 
 165. See, e.g., Fitbit App, FITBIT, https://fitbit.com/app (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016) (indicating that to communicate stats with “friends and followers,” a 
phone or computer is required); Forerunner® 10, supra note 10 (noting that to 
communicate with friends, data must be uploaded to a computer). 
 166. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (noting that the government entities made an 
argument that searching cell phones might “alert[] officers that confederates 
of the arrestee are headed to the scene” and concluding that though this is 
“undoubtedly a strong government interest,” the government entities did not 
adequately “suggest that their concerns [we]re based on actual experience”). 
 167. See, e.g., One, supra note 3 (describing the type of data captured and 
indicating that the device is “discreet”); Specifications: Display, FITBIT, https:// 
www.fitbit.com/one#specs (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (noting that one simply 
needs to “[p]ush the [display] button to cycle through daily stats” related to 
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a different way than the data held on a cell phone, as these de-
vices track both personal GPS information168 and heart rate da-
ta.169 The Court has suggested that GPS data is inherently per-
sonal in the context of vehicles,170 and it is thus likely that 
courts would find a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
non-regulated realm of personal travel.171 The privacy implica-
tions of knowing where an individual goes at which times of the 
day become even more disturbing when the tracker is located 
on one’s person, indicating travel once an individual exits her 
vehicle, potentially revealing activity within the home, an area 
strongly protected under Kyllo.172 
Courts have not yet determined the protective status of 
heart rate data, but given the Court’s past holdings regarding 
areas protected by the Fourth Amendment, it seems likely that 
the Court would find this data to be private.173 Even more so 
than GPS data, heart rate data has the potential to enable in-
ferences that reveal deeply personal information, such as sleep 
patterns, sexual activity, physical exertion, and general 
health,174 especially when the data is available second by se-
 
exercise, sleep, and food eaten). 
 168. See Forerunner® 10, supra note 10. 
 169. See, e.g., Charge HR, supra note 11. 
 170. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring). 
 171. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (“[R]educed expec-
tations of privacy derive . . . from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable 
of traveling on the public highways.”). 
 172. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[O]btaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the 
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion 
into a constitutionally protected area.” (internal quotes omitted)). 
 173. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (finding that cell 
phone searches generally require warrants and cannot be searched under the 
arrest exception); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945 (finding the placement of a GPS 
tracker on a vehicle to be a search); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27 (finding thermal im-
aging of the outside of the house to be a search). 
 174. See A High Heart Rate—What Can It Possibly Mean for You?, AZUMIO 
(Jan. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.azumio.com/blog/health/high-heart 
-rate-and-what-it-means (“A high heart rate can be due to many factors, such 
as physical activity, panic, stress, or anxiety.”); Is Sex Exercise? And Is It Hard 
on the Heart?, HARV. MED. PUBLICATIONS (June 1, 2011), http://www.health 
.harvard.edu/newsletters_article/is-sex-exercise-and-is-it-hard-on-the-heart 
(indicating that men’s heart rates increase during sexual activity, and that sex 
ranks as moderate physical activity); Resting Heart Rate Table, TOPEND 
SPORTS, http://www.topendsports.com/testing/heart-rate-resting-chart.htm 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (displaying resting heart rates with corresponding 
fitness levels). 
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cond.175 This certainly implicates activities within the home, 
which Kyllo protected even when the home is not physically in-
vaded by law enforcement.176  
Therefore, while cell phones contain bank information, 
communications with loved ones, and personal pictures,177 activ-
ity trackers contain highly personal heart rate information and 
GPS data which together have the potential to indicate where 
users travel and their emotional state while doing so. This is 
the fundamental purpose of the activity tracker—not simply an 
incidental function, as GPS data might be considered in the 
context of cell phones.  
c. Activity Trackers Hold Less Data than Cell Phones but the  
Data Is Intensely Personal 
Having looked at the types of data cell phones and activity 
trackers tend to hold, it is prudent to also compare the storage 
capacity of the devices. In Riley, the Court explicitly noted the 
great quantity of data that can be held by modern cell 
phones.178 Activity trackers hold notably less data than cell 
phones.179 Still, these trackers have the capacity to hold several 
days of very personal data.180 Additionally, some trackers are 
designed to automatically delete (or more accurately, record 
over) data after a certain number of days, whether or not the 
data has been saved or uploaded to the Internet.181  
This follows naturally from the different purposes between 
activity trackers and cell phones. Cell phones function as 
 
 175. See, e.g., Fitbit Help: How Do Fitbit Trackers Sync Their Data?, 
FITBIT, http://help.fitbit.com/articles/en_US/Help_article/How-do-Fitbit 
-trackers-sync-their-data (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 176. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 177. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (discussing cell phone features and 
storage capacity). 
 178. Id. (“The current top-selling smart phone has a standard capacity of 
16 gigabytes (and is available with up to 64 gigabytes). Sixteen gigabytes 
translates to millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of 
videos.”). 
 179. Activity tracker storage information describes storage not in bytes but 
in days or hours of data, so it is difficult to find a fair way to compare activity 
trackers and cell phones, but it is likely that fitness trackers hold less data 
than the average cell phone.  
 180. Fitbit Help, supra note 175 (“All Fitbit trackers can record detailed 
minute-by-minute [calorie burn and sleep] data for seven days . . . [and] heart 
rate data . . . for 30 days.”). 
 181. Id. (“Fitbit Surge can store a maximum of 35 hours of GPS data. If you 
try to track more than 35 hours worth of GPS data without syncing, older data 
will be deleted to make room for new data.”). 
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stand-alone devices and therefore have high storage capaci-
ties.182 Activity trackers are designed to sync and upload data to 
corresponding websites183 and accordingly need far less storage. 
Activity trackers also do not present the often-confusing prob-
lem of allowing access to files stored on the cloud.184 The storage 
capacity of activity trackers is fairly small, but the information 
that they do hold is vital and personal.  
However, the activity tracker context provides another av-
enue to address the difficult and as-yet unaddressed problem of 
how data that is uploaded to the Internet should be treated,185 
because activity tracker companies design their devices to near-
ly require186 the uploading of data to associated websites. This 
question is quite interesting in the context of activity trackers 
because these websites are designed to be tools used by indi-
vidual users, who have the ability to prevent their information 
from reaching the eyes of other users.187 Nonetheless, the fact 
that the data stored on activity trackers is likely regularly up-
loaded to the Internet means that under the Greenwood third-
party standard, there can be no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in this data.188  
 
 182. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading 
shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen 
to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. . . . One of the most notable dis-
tinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense storage capaci-
ty.”). 
 183. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 184. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (describing cloud computing as “the capacity 
of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather 
than on the device itself,” and indicating that this causes trouble for potential 
searches, as data stored on the cloud may not be searched without a warrant, 
but the officers may not know if it is stored locally or on the cloud). 
 185. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individ-
ual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily dis-
closed to third parties.”). 
 186. It should be noted, of course, that if a wearer is perfectly happy just 
viewing her daily statistics on the tracker itself each day, many trackers make 
that a possibility. However, many of the trackers’ features are most useful 
when viewed over several days’ time, and most trackers provide only a glimpse 
at current statistics when users do not upload their data. See, e.g., App + 
Dashboard, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/one#dashboard (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016) (showing the Fitbit One screen, which shows a single statistic repre-
sentative of the day or the moment at which the button is pressed). 
 187. One, supra note 3 (displaying data tracked through the Fitbit app on a 
mobile device or the Fitbit website, which include activity and exercise, 
weight, food intake, and sleep data). 
 188. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
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However, the Riley Court indicated a healthy respect for 
the privacy implications digital data can hold, stating that “In-
ternet search and browsing history, for example, can be found 
on an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an individual’s 
private interests . . . .”189 Additionally, Justice Sotomayor sug-
gested in her Jones concurrence that the Greenwood third-
party standard needs to be readdressed because it is “ill suited 
to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of infor-
mation about themselves to third parties in the course of carry-
ing out mundane tasks.”190 These statements were made re-
garding only the type of digital data collected on GPS devices 
and cell phones, and the privacy interest would likely be en-
hanced in the case of activity trackers containing heart rate 
trackers. This suggests that the intensely personal nature of 
the data contained on activity trackers might trump its poten-
tial to be shared with others.  
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT NEED FOR EASILY WORKABLE RULES 
The Court has clearly emphasized and prioritized the 
workability of the rules law enforcement must follow, which of-
ten leads the Court to establish clear bright-line rules. Robin-
son describes police decisions as “quick ad hoc judgment[s] 
which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken 
down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the 
search”191 and created a bright-line rule allowing officers to 
search all arrested persons at the time of arrest.192 Riley more 
recently noted a preference for police workability, quoting prec-
edent in stating, “[i]f police are to have workable rules, the bal-
ancing of the competing interests . . . ‘must in large part be 
done on a categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fash-
ion by individual police officers.’”193 This practical sentiment led 
the Court to determine that searching any digital data on cell 
phones—not only data with unsearchable physical counter-
parts—requires a warrant.194  
Though bright-line rules may initially appear inflexible, 
the Court often fashions exceptions where they are necessary. 
 
 189. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. 
 190. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 191. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 192. Id. at 236. 
 193. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491–92 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 
692, 705 n.19 (1981)) (omission in original). 
 194. Id. at 2495. 
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Though the Court created Robinson as a bright-line rule, it was 
willing to later make exceptions where the circumstances clear-
ly necessitated different treatment, including an exception 
based on time passed, an exception for arrestees who receive 
only citations, and an exception stating that vehicles are to be 
searched in narrower circumstances than other containers.195 
The Court has also exhibited a particular willingness to allow 
the exigency exception to supersede bright-line rules. Even 
when creating Riley’s bright-line rule requiring warrants to 
search all digital data found on cell phones, the Court held that 
arresting officers may still search digital data where exigent 
circumstances would otherwise allow them to do so.196 It ap-
pears that the Court prefers to establish clear rules for practi-
cal purposes—bright-line rules are easy for officers to follow 
while in the field, but officers can still employ the exigency ex-
ception to warrantless searches in extraordinary circumstances 
on a case-by-case basis.197 Law enforcement agencies’ need for 
workable rules to dictate officer conduct in typical situations, 
as well as superseding exceptions to handle exceptional situa-
tions, should guide the solution to the activity tracker problem.  
This need is especially applicable in the context of smart 
wearables like activity trackers—“[i]n the coming world of low-
cost wearable technology, requiring police officers to assess 
every mobile device and render a binary decision as to its capa-
bilities before searching it will not work.”198 After all, ten years 
ago no one knew that pedometers would be capable of storing 
days’ worth of GPS and heart rate data. Today that is the 
norm. In the future, when the “Internet of Things” becomes a 
reality, courts and law enforcement agencies will absolutely re-
quire a simple bright-line rule that can be applied broadly to all 
developing wearable technologies.  
 
 
 
 
 195. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 196. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.  
 197. Id. (“The critical point is that, unlike the search incident to arrest ex-
ception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine 
whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular 
case.”). 
 198. Patrick Brown, Note, Searches of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest: Over-
view of the Law as It Stands and a New Path Forward, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
563, 575 (2014). 
  
1720 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1689 
 
III.  WHEN SEARCHING ARRESTEES’ EFFECTS INCIDENT 
TO ARREST, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS SHOULD 
DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN PHYSICAL OBJECTS AND 
DIGITAL DATA   
Riley essentially recognized the innate differences between 
physical objects, such as the cigarette package searched in Rob-
inson, and digital containers like cell phones, which hold far 
more than Robinson would have anticipated.199 Courts should 
extend the cell phone exception to cover the digital data found 
in activity trackers and similar devices because the govern-
ment’s interest in the search incident to arrest exception does 
not adequately outweigh the great degree of intrusion upon the 
defendant’s privacy in the intensely private activity tracker da-
ta.200  
The ideal solution is for courts and law enforcement offic-
ers to adopt a two-tiered approach that considers separately the 
authority of officers to search the physical object and the digital 
data it contains. Under such an approach, the physical aspects 
of any digital container may be searched warrantlessly when it 
is found incident to a lawful arrest, but to access the digital da-
ta these containers hold, officers would need to secure a war-
rant. This solution is strongly supported by both case law and 
policy concerns. By recognizing the distinction between physi-
cal and digital evidence as Riley’s essential holding, courts can 
ensure that all digital data is protected adequately and imme-
diately. Until courts explicitly hold that Riley applies evenly to 
all smart devices, an argument can still be made that Riley ap-
plies solely to cell phones, and courts will be forced to analyze 
each device and its similarities and dissimilarities to cell 
phones. As demonstrated by various courts’ application of Riley 
to digital cameras and credit cards, this type of individual 
analysis breeds inconsistency and is a waste of judicial re-
sources.  
This Part describes that under this two-tiered framework, 
arresting officers have the capacity to physically examine the 
external case and body of the activity tracker without first ob-
taining a warrant. This Part goes on to explain that conversely, 
 
 199. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (“A search of the information on a cell phone 
bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in Rob-
inson.”). 
 200. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (indicating that 
searches must be assessed by balancing legitimate government interests 
against the degree of intrusion upon an individual’s privacy). 
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officers must obtain warrants to search digital data on activity 
trackers. This Part will then explain that the exigency excep-
tion will continue to allow officers to search through the data 
when they believe that the data will be deleted otherwise. Fi-
nally, this Part will caution that adequate training of law en-
forcement officers is crucial for the protection of arrestees’ pri-
vate data. 
A. PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS OF ACTIVITY TRACKERS MAY BE  
PERFORMED WARRANTLESSLY 
Though there is no danger of injury from the digital data 
contained within these devices, law enforcement officers should 
be able to physically examine these devices. These physical 
searches should be brief inspections of the physical device it-
self, for the purpose of ensuring that it is not a weapon201 and 
does not contain any weapons within it or its accompanying 
case, such as pins or razor blades.202  
Problematically, in such a physical inspection, law en-
forcement officers might not recognize activity trackers because 
these devices are not yet nearly as prevalent as cell phones in 
our society203 and they may not all be easily recognizable as be-
ing activity trackers.204 This means an officer might access digi-
tal information by clicking the button on the device and view-
ing the user’s daily statistics, possibly without even realizing 
what data she is accessing. While clicking the button of an un-
known device to ensure its functionality and that it is not mere-
ly a shell concealing a weapon might be considered acceptable, 
toggling through daily statistics would constitute a search re-
quiring a warrant in much the same way that searching 
 
 201. One could see, for example, why a shoe-based tracker like the 
SmartMove shoe insole, see Truong, supra note 4, could arouse suspicions in 
light of at least one attempted shoe bombing. See Shoe Bomber: Tale of Anoth-
er Failed Terrorist Attack, CNN (Dec. 25, 2009, 10:23 PM EST), http://www 
.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/25/richard.reid.shoe.bomber. 
 202. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (allowing officers, for example, to “determine 
whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone and its case”); Unit-
ed States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 257 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that even when finding envelopes, the Robinson standard would allow 
a search for safety purposes in case pins or razor blades were hidden within). 
 203. See supra Part II.A.1. But see Rettner, supra note 121 (indicating the 
rapid growth of the activity tracker market). 
 204. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2 (wristband); One, supra note 3 (clip-on de-
vice); Truong, supra note 4 (shoe insole). 
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through text messages or photos on a cell phone would require 
a warrant.205  
Law enforcement agencies should seek to avoid unconstitu-
tional searches, and brief training on the available types of 
wearable technology might go a long way towards this goal. In 
the wake of Riley, law enforcement agencies should thoroughly 
train their officers as to existing wearables, including smart ac-
tivity trackers, and the data these devices are capable of hold-
ing. Such training need not be lengthy, and could be done in the 
form of a handout or an email, provided officers were required 
to read it. However, such training should be updated fairly fre-
quently for two reasons. First, it will increase officer under-
standing of what they may lawfully search at the time of arrest, 
and as a result will protect the civil liberties of those searched 
incident to arrest. Second, this training, if kept up-to-date, will 
ensure that arresting officers realize the potential treasure 
troves of relevant evidence at their fingertips and apply for 
warrants in a timely manner to ensure that data is gathered.  
B. TO SEARCH DIGITAL DATA, OFFICERS MUST OBTAIN  
WARRANTS ABSENT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES  
Digital data on activity trackers should be protected as 
much as possible from warrantless searches because it is deep-
ly personal information. This Section explains that generally 
officers should not be allowed to search this digital data with-
out acquiring a warrant. However, this Section will go on to ex-
plain that the exigent circumstances exception might be used 
more often for activity trackers than for cell phones and will 
provide officers with the necessary discretion to warrantlessly 
search in emergency situations.  
1. Officers Generally May Not Search Digital Data Without a  
Warrant 
Some activity trackers contain incredibly personal data, in-
cluding heart rate and GPS data.206 While some smart activity 
trackers hold less important data than others,207 each new de-
vice collects more advanced types of data.208 Additionally, the 
 
 205. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 206. See, e.g., Charge HR, supra note 11 (heart rate); Forerunner® 10, su-
pra note 10 (GPS). 
 207. See, e.g., Zip, supra note 3 (tracking only steps, calorie burn, distance 
traveled, and relative activity). 
 208. See supra Part I.E (describing the historical development of Fitbit, the 
  
2016] SMART ACTIVITY TRACKERS 1723 
 
discrepancy between high-tech and low-tech activity trackers is 
comparable to that seen in Riley’s smart phone and Wurie’s flip 
phone.209 The Court created a bright-line rule for all cell phones, 
not just smart phones. For the same reasons, courts and law 
enforcement officers should protect all activity trackers by re-
quiring a warrant to access any digital data on an activity 
tracker. Either connecting the tracker to a computer or manu-
ally toggling through this data on the tracker itself would con-
stitute a search and would require a warrant.210 
One could argue that only the more personal forms of data 
should be protected, allowing officers to access step count or 
flights of stairs climbed without a warrant. However, this is 
impractical for two reasons. First, this would require officers to 
determine, at the time of arrest, which pieces of information 
are private and are not. This is a difficult determination to 
make in a split second, and would not produce a workable 
rule.211 Second, the physical nature of activity trackers would 
make such a rule even less workable. These trackers tend to 
have a single button allowing the data to come across the 
screen one by one,212 or do not have screens and require an up-
load to a computer, which instantly uploads all information 
from the tracker, unlimited by time or type.213  
An argument that law enforcement officers should be al-
lowed to warrantlessly search digital data if they would be able 
to search the physical counterpart214 was also rejected in Riley. 
Not only does this fail to provide a workable rule for law en-
forcement,215 but also many of the types of data collected and 
 
leading producer of activity trackers).  
 209. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480–81 (2014) (describing 
Riley’s smart phone as having “a broad range of other functions” and Wurie’s 
flip phone as having “a smaller range of features”). 
 210. Cf. id. at 2492–93 (finding that looking through data on the phone it-
self was an unreasonable search where no warrant was obtained beforehand). 
 211. See id. at 2491 (stating the Court’s “general preference to provide 
clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical rules”); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (indicating these decisions are “quick ad 
hoc judgment[s]”). 
 212. See Charge HR, supra note 11; One, supra note 3; Specifications: Dis-
play, supra note 167; Zip, supra note 3; supra note 167 and accompanying 
text. 
 213. See, e.g., Flex, supra note 2; Up, supra note 2.  
 214. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (discussing this argument in the 
context of cell phones). 
 215. Id. (objecting to the bulk of data that could be recovered and stating 
such a test would require “a difficult line-drawing expedition to determine 
which digital files are comparable to physical records,” leaving it “[un]clear 
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stored on activity trackers have no non-digital counterpart. 
Courts would be forced to first determine non-digital counter-
parts for each type of data—for instance, is a map a non-digital 
counterpart of GPS data, or must it be manually labeled with 
timestamps?—and second, determine whether the substitute 
would be protected. Such a process would take far too long to be 
a workable rule for law enforcement officers.  
Finally, it should be noted that the process of actually ob-
taining warrants need not be seen as a barrier—in fact, the ef-
ficiency of this process in the modern world was noted in Ri-
ley.216 Warrants for these devices would, of course, face some 
challenges,217 but this is true of all warrants for digital data, in-
cluding the cell phone warrants prescribed by Riley. The fact 
that the warrant application process is in flux should be no 
barrier to this workable and practical solution. 
2. The Exigency Exception Would Enable Officers To Search  
Digital Data on Activity Trackers in Emergency Circumstances 
Despite the speed at which warrants can be obtained,218 the 
Court found in Riley that across-the-board rules without explic-
it exceptions do not adequately protect officer safety, and there-
fore found that officers were entitled to search digital data on 
cell phones in exigent circumstances.219 Due to the fairly similar 
nature of activity trackers to cell phones, officers should be able 
 
how officers could make these kinds of decisions before conducting a search, or 
how courts would apply the proposed rule”). 
 216. Id. (indicating that in some jurisdictions warrants can be requested 
via iPad and can be signed and returned to the officer on the scene within fif-
teen minutes of the request). 
 217. See, e.g., James Saylor, Note, Computers As Castles: Preventing the 
Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Searches, 
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2809, 2847 (2011) (describing the conflict of reconciling 
the plain view exception, allowing officers to use anything in plain view, with 
modern searches of digital data where all data is downloaded at once). For a 
discussion of what such warrants should look like, see generally Andrew D. 
Huynh, Note, What Comes After “Get a Warrant”: Balancing Particularity and 
Practicality in Mobile Device Search Warrants Post-Riley, 101 CORNELL L. 
REV. 187 (2015), and Paul M. Ervasti, Is the Particularity Requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment Particular Enough for Digital Evidence?, ARMY LAW., Oct. 
2015, at 3, 3. 
 218. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493. 
 219. Id. at 2486 (“[T]he interest in protecting officer safety does not justify 
dispensing with the warrant requirement across the board. To the extent dan-
gers to arresting officers may be implicated in a particular way in a particular 
case, they are better addressed through consideration of case-specific excep-
tions to the warrant requirement, such as the one for exigent circumstances.”). 
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to rely on the exigency exception to search digital data on the 
scene under exceptional circumstances.  
For illustrative purposes, imagine that officers have been 
investigating a cocaine smuggling ring and have pinpointed one 
suspect whom they believe to be involved. Officers believe, from 
the patterns of cocaine availability in the community, that the 
suspect meets with the kingpin of the ring on Sundays at a con-
sistent time and location. The officers believe if they can de-
termine the location of these meetings, they will be able to use 
that information to identify other members of the ring. Suppose 
the suspect is arrested on a Monday afternoon wearing an ac-
tivity tracker with GPS data that is automatically deleted eve-
ry twenty-four hours. In that instance, arresting officers might 
not be able to afford waiting to obtain a warrant—the suspect 
likely visited the location in question within 24 hours and the 
relevant data has the potential to be deleted within minutes. 
Those officers, under the two-tiered approach, would be allowed 
under the exigency exception to download the data before it 
was deleted in order to find the location of the meeting place of 
the drug smugglers. Thus, when there is probable cause to be-
lieve that evidence on the tracker will be destroyed or deleted, 
as in the case of heart rate data that will be deleted in seven 
days,220 officers should be allowed to access the data before a 
warrant can be obtained and before the data will be lost. 
It is important to note that without officer training, the 
good faith exception could swallow the rule by allowing activity 
tracker data gathered during improperly warrantless searches 
to be presented at trial where the law enforcement officer be-
lieved in good faith that he could search the device.221 An officer 
who knows only that wearables contain helpful information and 
that some of them delete their data on a periodic basis might 
mistakenly search all wearables for fear of destruction of evi-
dence. For this reason, training is all the more important. It 
may be wise for courts to bar introduction of evidence where 
such evidence is admissible only under the good faith exception 
and the officer had not been properly trained regarding smart 
wearables. This would strongly encourage law enforcement 
agencies to ensure that their officers were properly trained. 
 
 220. See Fitbit Help, supra note 175 (indicating that some data is deleted 
as soon as thirty-five hours after it is collected, while some remains on the de-
vice for several weeks).  
 221. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (considering 
the implications of officer training with regards to the good faith exception). 
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The exigency exception will therefore prevent the two-tiered 
approach from tying the hands of law enforcement in circum-
stances in which officers have no choice but to either access the 
data or see it lost forever.222  
C. COUNTERARGUMENTS TO THE TWO-TIERED SOLUTION  
CANNOT PREVAIL 
Several potential counterarguments to this Note’s proposal 
to protect activity tracker data can be predicted. Still, no coun-
terargument unseats the two-tiered approach as the most logi-
cal way to approach searches of activity tracker data.  
First, some might suggest that data of activity trackers is 
not accurate enough to warrant protection.223 There have not 
yet been any court determinations of the accuracy of activity 
tracker evidence, or how strongly such data may be relied upon. 
Heart rate data in particular can be critiqued on the following 
basis: even if a heart rate is high, it is not clear why it is ele-
vated.224 Such a reliability determination is outside the scope of 
this Note. It should be noted, however, that in a civil suit in 
Canada, Fitbit data has been used to support a personal injury 
claim.225 Moreover, law enforcement has relied on Fitbit data in 
at least one prosecution,226 and the government has requested 
activity tracker data from at least one activity tracker produc-
er, indicating that law enforcement officers think this infor-
mation is valuable in some contexts, whether or not it will be 
admissible in court.227 Additionally, it is important that courts 
 
 222. Additionally, it may be possible in such circumstances for law en-
forcement officers to subpoena the related companies for the desired infor-
mation. See Gabriel R. Schlabach, Note, Privacy in the Cloud: The Mosaic 
Theory and the Stored Communications Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 677, 679–80 
(2015) (indicating that even where law enforcement officers can and do acquire 
information through this process, the result is a “mosaic” of the data). 
 223. See Elizabeth Murray, Fitbit Lawsuit Alleges Heart Rate Monitors Are 
Inaccurate, Misleading, TODAY (Jan. 8, 2016, 7:40 AM), http://www 
.today.com/health/fitbit-lawsuit-alleges-heart-rate-monitors-are-inaccurate 
-misleading-t65956 (describing a recent lawsuit brought by Fitbit customers 
against the company, claiming that its heart rate trackers do not always 
properly display accurate heart rates). 
 224. See sources cited supra note 173 (suggesting the Supreme Court would 
likely find heart rate data private). 
 225. See Alexander Howard, How Data from Wearable Tech Can Be Used 
Against You in a Court of Law, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2015, 2:41 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexander-howard/how-data-from-wearable-te_ 
b_7698764.html. 
 226. See Schooler, supra note 131. 
 227. See Lee, supra note 136 (indicating that Fitbit has received requests 
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not allow any perceived inaccuracy of modern day activity 
trackers to prevent law enforcement officers from using data 
from future, more advanced, and technically accurate devices.  
Second, critics might argue that activity trackers do not 
hold enough data to earn the same protection as cell phones. No 
matter the quantity of data on activity tracker, it is so compre-
hensive that it must be protected.228 Riley emphasized that cell 
phone data “form[s] a revealing montage of the user’s life.”229 
The GPS, heart rate, calorie burn, flights of stairs, and other 
data found on activity trackers similarly would allow law en-
forcement officers to reassemble the user’s life. This data 
should therefore be protected.  
Finally, critics might suggest that protection is not needed 
because some activity trackers automatically delete their data 
after a certain amount of days. It is crucial to note, however, 
that in the modern world, a warrant can be obtained in as little 
as fifteen minutes.230 Arguments that activity trackers’ auto-
matic deletion of data should entitle the officer to a warrantless 
search are therefore unlikely to be persuasive in most circum-
stances.231 
A two-tiered approach with separate requirements for 
searching the physical object and the digital data it contains is 
the ideal flexible solution to cover all wearables, including 
smart activity trackers. Employing such a standard would re-
quire officer training to recognize wearables and search their 
exteriors for concealed weapons while refraining from search-
ing their digital contents. This training would also teach offic-
ers about the types of data that can be held by various weara-
bles and the importance of obtaining a timely search warrant to 
access this potentially invaluable data. This solution therefore 
 
from law enforcement agencies for data of individual customers). 
 228. See Andrew Pincus, Evolving Technology and the Fourth Amendment: 
The Implications of Riley v. California, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307, 329 n.86 
(noting that some “might try to argue that sensors collecting a single category 
of information should not be encompassed under Riley’s rationale, but the 
comprehensive nature of that information” causes it to fit under the Riley um-
brella). 
 229. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). 
 230. See id. at 2493. 
 231. It is also crucial to note that with the training this Note recommends, 
officers should be more likely to know which trackers delete their data within 
hours rather than weeks. Additionally, they would be more likely to know 
whether a particular activity tracker will soon delete the relevant data, and 
thus know whether exigent circumstances truly exist. 
  
1728 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1689 
 
maximizes individual privacy rights, officer safety, and law en-
forcement productivity.  
  CONCLUSION   
In Riley, the Court held that cell phones were meaningfully 
different from non-digital objects found on arrestees in searches 
incident to arrests due to the type and quality of data they are 
capable of holding. In holding that searching cell phones found 
incident to arrest requires a warrant, the Court indicated that 
digital data was qualitatively different from physical objects 
found during pat downs. After the Court decided Riley, smart 
activity trackers have continued to gain popularity and their 
features continue to advance. Now that Riley has suggested at 
least some digital data is given more zealous protection than 
physical objects, law enforcement officers need a standard for 
how and when smart activity trackers and other wearables may 
be searched at the scene of arrest and when a warrant is re-
quired.  
The best way to resolve this problem is to create a two-
tiered approach distinguishing between searches of physical ob-
jects and the digital data they contain. Such an approach would 
allow officers to inspect the physical activity trackers for poten-
tial danger, but not to look through or search digital data be-
fore obtaining a warrant to do so. In a circumstance in which 
the officer believes that exigent circumstances exist in the form 
of inevitable deletion of evidence relevant to the crime of arrest, 
the officer is free to access the data and the courts can later ad-
dress her actions. Finally, government entities and officers 
must be made aware of the wide array of smart devices that ex-
ist, including smart activity trackers. Awareness and under-
standing of these devices will be key to appropriately balancing 
government interests and citizen privacy. 
